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Abstract  
 In this paper I consider a politician, an agent to the society, who wants to construct a dam 
that benefits the society. Due to various reasons such as lack of knowledge or time to 
construct and coordinate the construction work of the  dam, the politician delegate these 
activities to its employee, a bureaucrat. The bureaucrat her self delegates the construction 
work of the dam to a contractor. The politician allocates a fixed budget to the bureaucrat so as 
to maximize the expected values the dam gives to the society. Given the budget, bureaucrat 
designs an incentive feasible menu of contract to the contractor. The bureaucrat’s contract 
specifies the quality of the dam constructed and the contingent transfer to the contractor. 
Satisfying the incentives and participation constraints of the contractor, the bureaucrat 
maximizes the expected value of the dam and the excess budget. The excess budget to the 
bureaucrat is the difference between the budget allocated to her and the contingent transfer 
she makes to the contractor. Bureaucrat values an excess budget by attaching a weight. 
Bureaucrat attaches larger weight to the excess budget values it more than those attach a 
lower weight. In order to judge the expected value of the dam under the contract offered by 
bureaucrat, I choose the standard second best contract as the benchmark. Comparing the 
contract offered by bureaucrat to the benchmark, I show that bureaucrat offers a contract that 
provides a better expected value of the dam to the society than the benchmark contract. Even 
though bureaucrat offers a better contract than the benchmark, the objective she involves in 
maximizing excess budget creates a problem for the politician and the society. Thus, I show 
that direct control by the politician can decrease the weight the bureaucrat attaches to the 
excess budget and provides a better expected value of the dam to the society. I also extend the 
model to a case in which the Politician’s objective function sets to internalize the pollution 
cost due to the construction of the dam so as to attain the socially minimum and efficient level 
of pollution. Assuming that the objective of the bureaucrat is not set in such way that she 
internalizes the pollution cost arises from the construction of the dam, I show that centralized 
contract by the politician can solve this difference in objectives between the politician and the 
bureaucrat and helps the politician to control the bureaucrat.       
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1 Introduction 
Multitudes of market failures including underdevelopment and poverty have been among 
the justifications for governments to take activist role in an economy. These activities include 
building schools and training workers, which are often undertaken through delegation. 
Delegation of public services either to private organization or bureaucrat (government 
employee) is a common phenomenon. These services often fail due to many problems. One of 
these problems is the fact that the services are delivered by people who have their own 
interests that may not be compatible with public interest.  Most importantly, the incentives 
and constraints that bureaucrat or private organization faces may not result in decisions that 
expand social welfare. As a result, government rules and regulations as well as public 
programs or services may not be implemented in the way that their advocates want them to 
be. In consequence, public interventions may not have the impact that they are intended to 
have. 
Over the past few decades, a lot has been studied about why bureaucrats behave the way 
they do. Much of these insights have come from the application of “economic” or “public 
choice” models to bureaucratic institutions. These models of bureaucratic behavior explicitly 
or implicitly assume that individuals are the only actor and decision maker. Individuals such 
as bureaucrats recognize their alternatives, anticipate potential outcomes, and rationally 
attempt to maximize their well-being in the face of incentives and constraints. 
To maximize their well-being, bureaucrats have informational advantage over the societies. 
Since this information is scarce and costly to obtain, the ability of the societies and their 
representatives to monitor and control bureaucracy is often limited. Thus, bureaucrats behave 
this way not because they are bad, rather they are rational actors. Benson (1995) argued that 
bureaucrats are not bad people, after all.  They are very good people who choose their jobs in 
part because they see “important” issues that they feel must be addressed. Breton and 
Wintrobe (1982) argue that one need not assume Machiavellian behavior, deceit or dishonesty 
on the part of bureaucracy to understand bureaucratic inefficiency. This is because in all 
likelihood they pursue their own interest like every one else though it might be veiled in the 
self perception of dedication and altruism. 
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Niskanen (1968; 1971) assumed that bureaucrats in public office could be characterized as 
budget maximizers. For such budget maximizing objective to matter, bureaucrat must have 
the discretion and power to pursue its own interests. 
Bureaucrat maximizes budget when there is uncertainty. Mueller (1989) explained that 
“uncertainty creates the potential to exercise power; information provides the capacity to do 
so.” If there is no uncertainty (if the oversight sponsor has full knowledge of the working of 
bureaucrat), then bureaucrats can have no discretions and power to pursue their personal 
objectives. However, the uncertainty and measurement problem that commonly exist in the 
sponsor-bureaucrat relationship creates a major monitoring problem for the sponsor. Niskanen 
(1971) recognized measurement problem create a significant monitoring problem for the 
sponsor. Tullock (1965), Breton and Wintorbe (1982) are also recognized the same problem. 
Migue and Belanger (1974) explained that budget maximization limits the range of utility 
maximizing efforts. They proposed that, bureaucrat seeks discretion reflected by budgets with 
excess revenues over actual costs. These excess revenues are referred to as a “discretionary 
budget” or “organizational slack.”  As Moe (1997) argued, this is equivalent to the personal 
income of the bureaucrat. Discretionary budgets may be the sources of many of bureaucratic 
perquisites, for instance, and perhaps for some of the bureaucrat’s income as well. Therefore, 
uncertainties embodied in the bureaucrat personal interest (mostly different from the 
sponsor’s interest) create a hug information gap between the sponsor and the bureaucrat. 
Thus, the sponsor should have a mechanism that enables it to get as much information as 
possible from the bureaucrat. 
In order to reduce the information gap between the sponsor and the bureau, the sponsor 
should employ the “principal agent model.” The principal agent model was initially developed 
to investigate more general questions of incomplete information and risk sharing (Ross, 1973; 
Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971) and it has become a major analytical tool in the general 
literature on information economics. Later on, its relevance for organizational analysis was 
quickly recognized, and applicability to the central issues of organizational theory is growing 
(Jensen; 1983). The principal agent model is an analytic expression of the agency relationship 
in which one party, the principal, consider entering in to a contractual agreement with another, 
the agent, in the expectation that the agent will subsequently choose action that provides 
outcomes desired by the principal. 
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The principal may seek out an agent for various reasons. Often it may lack specialized 
knowledge or legal certification that the agent posses. Here, we raise the principal agent 
model as a means in which the principal designs an incentive to the agent and gets as much 
information as possible about his true type (or simply as means to control the agent). 
I consider control in bureaucracy with three layers hierarchy: the politician, the bureaucrat, 
and the contractor. Several papers in economics and political science literature have studied 
control in bureaucracy and most of them are focus on incentives schemes offered to the agent 
in the standard two - level hierarchy with a principal and an agent. Exceptions are Banerjee 
(1997), Khalil and Kim (2011) and Prendergast (2003). Banerjee and Prendergast consider a 
situation where the bureaucrat, on behalf of the government, designs resource allocation 
scheme for the consumers who have private information about their types and show how these 
scheme are distorted or result in inefficiency. Khalil and Kim on the other hand use the same 
hierarchical level and arrived on the same result except that they focus on the production side. 
This paper is also related to Hiriart and Martimort (2011), who consider a hierarchy 
congress- regulator- firm. The regulator offers an incentive contract to the firm in order to 
limit some potential damage, so delegation letting the regulator chooses the optimal contract 
allows the regulator to tailor the contract to the potential damage. However, the regulator puts 
more weight on the firm`s ability to design the contract by imposing rules (limit on transfer) 
on the potential contract. 
In this paper I would like to consider a dam constructed by the politician for the benefit of 
the mass or society. Assuming that the politician may lack specialized knowledge, legal 
certification that the agent posses or due to some other reasons, it delegates the detail task of 
mechanism designs and offering contract to the agent in this case the contractor to its delegate 
or the bureaucrat. As any government bureaucracies, the politician allocates a fixed budget to 
the bureaucrat that has to be returned if unspent. While bureaucrats are supposed to return this 
unspent budget to the politician, they may instead go on extravagant spending when the 
excess budget is available for discretionary spending. The discretionary budget allows the 
bureaucrat to pursue goals different from those of the politician. This goal is known as “policy 
drift” (Johansson; 1986). 
The bureaucrat involves in policy drift goals at the expense of providing a lower expected 
benefit of the dam to the society. Thus, the politician should have a mechanism that helps it to 
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control the bureaucrat so as to reduce the excess budget to the bureaucrat. This control shifts 
the budget from the budget drift goal of the bureaucrat to the benefits the construction of the 
dam gives to the society. To have a clear idea of the effect of controlling the bureaucrat, I will 
beginn with the case in which the politician doesn’t control the bureaucrat. Once I find the 
optimal outcomes under the case the politician doesn’t control the bureaucrat, then I extend 
the case in which the politician control the bureaucrat. Finally I compare the two cases and 
characterize the results. 
Furthermore, I will go on analyzing the case when the politician gives emphasis to the 
pollution impact the construction of the dam causes on the societies. The key insight here is 
that besides maximizing the expected value of the dam, the politician objective function is 
also set in such a way that it minimizes the pollution cost the construction of the dam causes 
on the society. However, for the reason I would explain later, the bureaucrat objective 
function is set only to maximize the expected value of the dam and excess budget by 
disregarding the pollution problem arises from the construction of the dam. Thus, there are 
conflicting objectives between the politician and the bureaucrat. How to solve this conflicting 
problem? And what is its effect on the expected value of the dam? These are the questions I 
will address in this section. 
To characterize the results; I use the second best contract offered by the private manager as 
the benchmark. Thus, what are the distinctive features of contract designed by bureaucrat as 
compared to the contract designed by private managers?, how the politician controls the 
budget drift goal of the bureaucrat and what is its effect on the expected benefits the dam 
gives to the society?, how the politician should control the bureaucrat to make her inline with 
its objective of minimizing the pollution impact arises from the construction of the dam.? 
These are the questions I focus on in this paper. 
I assume that the politician represents the society or any governmental agencies that acts 
on behalf of the society. It provides the financial resources for the construction work of the 
dam; accepts the dam milestone and its completion. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and characterizes the 
model with three layers (i.e, a politician, a bureaucrat, and a contractor) with their respective 
payoffs. In section 3 I present the contract offered by the bureaucrat to the contractor under 
asymmetric information about the contractor’s type and analyze the results by comparing it to 
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the benchmark model (in fact, in the case in which the politician doesn’t control the 
bureaucrat). In section 4 I present the politician’s problem and show that it allocates a fixed 
budget regardless of the bureaucrat’s type. In section 5 I extend section 3 to the case the 
politician exercise direct control on the bureaucrat. In section 6 I extend the politician 
objective to the case it internalizes the pollution cost arises from the construction of the dam 
and finally I conclude in section 7.     
 2 The Model 
I will present a hierarchical model with three layers; a politician (“it”), a bureaucrat (“she”) 
and a contractor or an agent (“he”). The politician is the funding authority and I assume that it 
has no informational capability, ability or time to run the project it funds. In the language of 
Aghion and Tirole (1997), the politician has formal authority but it must withdraw real 
authority to the bureaucrat who runs the agency. The bureaucrat her self contract with the 
agent or contractor who constructs the dam. 
The contractor or the agent is the productive unit in the hierarchy. He constructs the dam 
with quality level denoted by q at a private cost C(q) = Өq, where Ө > 0. The constant Ө is 
private information of the agent or the contractor and represents his type. It can take two 
values Ө1 with probability λ1 and Ө2 with probability λ2 (with ∆Ө = Ө2 - Ө1 > 0 and λ1 + λ2 = 
1). The contingent transfer to the contractor of type Ө1 or type Ө2 is t1 or t2 for the quality of 
the dam q1 or q2 he constructs respectively. 
In addition to the private cost, the contractor has also pollution cost R(q) = βq. The 
constant β is private information of the contractor with β > 0 and takes two values β1 with 
probability α1 and β2 with probability α2 with (∆β = β2 - β1 > 0  and α1 + α2 = 1). Therefore, the 
total social cost of the contractor is the sum of its private cost and pollution cost i.e T(q) = 
C(q) + R(q) = Өq + βq = (Ө + β)q. 
I begin with the case in which the politician cares only for maximizing the expected value 
of the dam. Later on I will extend the model to the case in which the politician minimizes the 
pollution impact arises from the construction of the dam. 
I use the social cost when I extend the model to the case in which the politician is an 
environmentalist (section 6). In the next sections, section 3, section 4 and section 5 I use the 
private cost of the contractor for the analysis. 
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2.1 The Players Payoffs 
For successful delegation of the construction works of the dam to the contractor, the 
bureaucrat must offer the utility level at least as high as the utility level the contractor gets 
outside the relationship. In other words the participation constraints of the contractor should 
be satisfied. Normalizing the outside utility level of the contractor to 0, the participation 
constraint of the contractor should satisfy these conditions:  
ti - Өiqi  ≥  0 (the case the politician doesn’t  concern for the environment), and  
ti - (Өi + βi)qi  ≥  0 (the case the politician concerns for the environment). 
The politician is interested in the construction of the dam but does not have the time or 
ability to manage the contractor who runs the construction process. It delegates the task of 
contracting with the contractor to the bureaucrat. If the politician cannot design an incentive 
structure for the bureaucrat depends on her type and also doesn’t exercise direct control, it 
allocates a fixed budget to the bureaucrat denoted by B, to maximize the expected net value of 
the dam, 
P(q) = λ1V(q1) + λ2V(q2) – B.  
Where, λ1 and λ2 are the probabilities of Ө1-type and Ө2-type contractors respectively, V(q) is 
the expected values the quality of the dam gives to the society and it  is an increasing and 
concave function of q. 
If the politician has asymmetric information about bureaucrat’s type and at the same time 
can designs an incentive contract to the bureaucrat with exercising direct control on her, it 
offers a contract to the bureaucrat by specifying different budgets and control intensities. This 
contract should satisfy the incentive constraint of the bureaucrat to mitigate the adverse 
selection problem that faces the politician.  
Bureaucrat offers a contract to the agent specifying the quality (q1 or q2) and the contingent 
transfer (t1 or t2). The agent is a standard contractor, which has private information about his 
construction cost stated above. Thus, he must be given an incentive scheme to limit his 
information rent. The contractor has his own interest at heart and is induced to pursue the 
bureaucrat’s interest only to the extent that the incentive structures imposed in their contract 
renders such behavior advantageous. 
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The essence of the bureaucrat’s problem is the design of such an incentive structure. The 
difficulty of course, is that the information about the contractor’s true type and input on which 
they are based is not only imperfect but skewed in favor of the interest of the contractor. This 
yields adverse selection problems that must some how mitigated. The bureaucrat must weave 
these integrated components in to the contractual framework in mitigating the informational 
asymmetry and structuring rewards, prompt the contractor to behave as the bureaucrat herself 
would under what ever condition might prevail. 
Even though bureaucrat designs this incentive to the contractor, her personal interest which 
is not inline with the interest of the politician will affect the expected value of the dam. 
Bureaucrats gave more weight to their personal interest and a number of literatures also 
assumed this behavior of bureaucracy. We incorporate the interests of the bureaucrat (that 
compatible with the interest of the politician and that favor the bureaucrat at the cost of the 
interest of the politician) in setting her objective function. 
On the other hand, there are also bureaucrats who get great satisfaction from 
“conscientious devotion to duty” given to them from the politician. The literatures have 
indicated that, bureaucrats rely on their self motivation and professions to resolve incentive 
problems. They receive most of their incentives from outside the bureaucracy mainly from 
organized groups of fellow practitioners and self satisfaction of doing their duty well. For 
instance doctors and nurses get satisfaction from curing patient, academics take satisfaction in 
contributing to the advancement of knowledge, teachers take pleasure from producing good 
students and aid workers cares about successful provision of aid. 
The number of literatures pointed out the above characteristic of bureaucrat. Among them, 
(Rose-Ackerman; 1986) has argued that bureaucrats are professionals; they are trained in 
“professions”, which emphasize not only technical competency but also conscientious 
devotion to duty”. Prendergast (2007), Besley and Ghatak (2005) have pointed out that 
bureaucrat in public office are often intrinsically motivated to deliver goods or services they 
are engaged to produce. They argued that bureaucrats are organizing around a mission and 
bureaucrats work harder when they buy in to the mission of organization. 
I consider this feature of bureaucrat and characterizing it by attaching a weight to its 
objective function (the objective function she involves in budget drift). Bureaucrat attaches 
larger weight to their budget drift objective are called “less motivated” bureaucrat and those 
who attaches lower weight to the budget drift objective are “motivated” bureaucrat. The 
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bureaucrat is motivated to deliver the expected value of the dam (λ1V(q1) + λ2V(q2)), and in 
addition, she also values unspent budgets (B - λ1t1 - λ2t2) to engage in policy drift. We capture 
this by introducing a parameter k [0, 1] to represent bureaucrat relative preference for policy 
drift i.e her intrinsic motivation. Thus, we have the following objective function for the 
bureaucrat: 
U(k, B, q) =  [λ1V(q1) + λ2V(q2)] + k(B - λ1t1 - λ2t2).  
Where, U(k, B,q) is the utility bureaucrat drives from the value of the dam and budget drift 
goals. It is an increasing and concave function of k and B. t1 and t2 are the contingent transfers 
to the efficient or the inefficient contractor respectively. 
From bureaucrat’s objective function we can see that if k = 0, the bureaucrat only cares 
about the expected value of the dam [λ1V(q1) + λ2V(q2)] and she is extremely motivated. If k 
= 1, the bureaucrat cares about policy drift as much as the expected value of the dam. Thus, a 
higher k indicates that the bureaucrat is less motivated and has stronger preference for policy 
drift.  
My model of bureaucracy is similar to Khalil and Kim (2011) and I use this model to 
analyze my cases and provide solutions to the problems at hand. 
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2.2 The Timing of the Game 
The timing of the game is the following. First the politician allocates a fixed budget B to 
the bureaucrat, second the bureaucrat offers an incentive contract to the contractor specifying 
the expected qualities of the dam constructed (q1 and q2) and as well as the corresponding 
transfers (t1 and t2). We assume that the contractor learns his type before signing the contract 
and therefore, we have a model of adverse selection. Finally construction takes place and the 
appropriate transfer is given to the contractor. Where, t represents time this can be presented 
as, 
t = 0                     t = 1                                      t = 2                                       t = 3 
 
 
         Politician (it)             Bureaucrat (she)                   Contractor (he) 
He discovers       It allocates                     she offers a contract                  He accept/reject the 
 his type Ө        Budget, B                         Specifying                                contract 
                                                        {(t1, q1), (t2, q2)}                                
 
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contract 
Using the revelation principle, we impose the following incentive constraints on the 
bureaucrat’s maximization problem: 
ti - Өiqi  ≥  tj - Өiqj for i, j = 1,2, (ICi).   
The participation constraint,  
ti - Өiqi  ≥ 0  for i = 1,2 (IRi).   
And the budget constraint,  
ti  ≤  B for i = 1,2  (BGi)   
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The first two constraints (ICi) and (IRi) are the standard constraints in the model of adverse 
selection and (BGi) is the budget constraint that limits the transfer to the contractor by the 
fixed budget allocated to the bureaucrat. 
2.4 The Standard Second Best Contract 
I use the standard second best contract, the contract in which the politician can observe the 
quality of the dam constructed and directly offers contract to the contractor as the benchmark. 
Let call this contract the private procurement contract so as to differentiate it from the contract 
I deal with, contract offered by the bureaucrat. As it is stated on different books and 
literatures, the optimal level of the standard second best private procurement contract (PP) is 
given by the menu: 
V`(q1) = Ө1,    
t1 = Ө1q1 + ∆Өq2, 
t2 = Ө2q2 and 
V`(q2) = λ1/λ2*∆Ө + Ө2.  
The low cost or the efficient type of contractor constructs the efficient quality of the dam, 
V`(q1) > V`(q2),  and receives an information rent of ∆Өq2 while the high cost type has his 
quality level of the dam distorted below the efficient level and receives no information rent. 
This is the separating contract that sort contractors based on their types or construction costs. 
The efficient contractor constructs a higher quality dam than what the inefficient contractor 
does and this is the same as to say q1 > q2 and this again implies t1 > t2. 
 Having the player’s payoffs and specifying the benchmark contract, next, I will see the 
bureaucrat’s problem with a fixed budget B allocated from the politician. I analyze this case 
under the circumstance in which the politician doesn’t exercise direct control over the 
bureaucrat and characterize the results by comparing to the benchmark model. Later on, I will 
extend the model to the case in which the politician delegate the tasks of offering contract to 
the contractor to its delegate, the bureaucrat, with exerting direct control on her (when the 
bureaucrat is not free rider). 
 Finally I extend the model to the case in which the politician internalizes the pollution cost 
arises from the construction of the dam and reduces its impact on the society. In this section I 
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will develop a model to see how the politician can control the bureaucrat and attains the goal 
of pollution reduction. Under such circumstance I assume that bureaucrat has no any concern 
for the pollution cost arises from the construction of the dam and doesn’t include in her 
objective function. The reason is that internalizing the pollution cost increases the contingent 
transfers to the contractor and so that decreases her excess budget.    
3 The Bureaucrat’s Problem 
If the politician doesn’t exercise direct control on the bureaucrat and at the same time 
cannot classify the bureaucrat by her type, the politician allocates a fixed budget to the 
bureaucrat and so that the bureaucrat solves, 
U(k, B, q), such that (ICi),  (IRi) and (BGi) for i = 1,2, are satisfied. 
Note that this problem is different from the private procurement problem, the benchmark, in 
two ways. First, the objective function of the bureaucrat includes two new parameters k and B 
and second there is also the new budget constraint (BGi). Solving the bureaucrat’s problem, 
we can see below that bureaucrat offers the private procurement contract if the budget 
constraints are not binding and k = 1. If the budget constraints are binding and k < 1, this 
contract is different from the private procurement contract. Here, we will see how the 
motivation of the bureaucrat (k) and the budget level (B) affects the expected value of the 
dam as compared to the benchmark contract, the private procurement contract (PP). 
 
3.1 The Optimal Contract 
First note that (IR2), the individual rationality constraint of the inefficient contractor and 
(IC1), the incentive compatibility constraint of the efficient contractor are binding. If not, the 
bureaucrat could reduce the transfers and enjoy gains. To refrain my self from the case in 
which the transfer of the efficient contractor exceed the budget, I assume that q1 ≥ q2 (the 
monotonicity constraint and let represented it by (M)); then constraint (IC1) implies that t1 ≥ 
t2. This again implies the budget constraint (BG2) will satisfy if constraint (BG1) holds. So, we 
can safely ignore (BG2) from the lists of the constraints. Based on these arguments, we can 
present the bureaucrat problem using only the relevant constraints. The bureaucrat chooses the 
contract (q1, q2, t1, t2) to solve the problem,  
max (U(k, B)), subjected to (IR2), (IC1), (BG1) and (M).  
Substituting t1 and t2 using the binding (IR2) and (IC1), and setting the Lagrange we can write 
the Lagrange as follows:   
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 L = λ1V(q1) + λ2V(q2) + k(B - λ1(Ө1q1 + ∆Өq2) - λ2Ө2q2) +ϒ(B - (Ө1q1 + ∆Өq2) + µ(q1 - q2). 
Where, ϒ ≥ 0 and µ ≥ 0 are the Lagrange multipliers for (BG1) and (M) constraints 
respectively. The two first order conditions with respect to the qualities are: 
W.r.t q1:  λ1V` (q1) - kλ1Ө1 - ϒӨ1 + µ = 0. 
w.r.t q2:  λ2V` (q2) - kλ1∆Ө - kλ2Ө2 - ϒ∆Ө - µ = 0. Rearranging the results we have, 
V` (q1) = Ө1(k + ϒ/λ1) - µ/λ1.                                (1) 
V` (q2) = kӨ2 + ∆Ө(λ1/λ2 * k +ϒ/λ2) + µ/λ2.           (2) 
 
3.2 The Budget Constrain doesn’t bind 
From the results I presented above, we have several cases to analyze depending on whether 
the two constraints (BG1) and (M) are binding or not. If the budget constraint is not binding, it 
implies that its multiplier ϒ = 0. Thus, (1) and (2) are reducing to, 
V`(q1) = kӨ1 - µ/λ1 and, 
V` (q2) = λ1/λ2 * k * ∆Ө + k * Ө2 + µ/λ2  
Provide that Ө2 > Ө1, kӨ1 - µ/λ1 < λ1/λ2 * k * ∆Ө + k * Ө2 + µ/λ2, which implies that q1 > 
q2. Again this implies µ = 0. Thus, the expected optimal value of the dam under the case in 
which budget constrain doesn’t bind is given by:  
V`(q1) = kӨ1.                              (3)  
V`(q2) = K(λ1/λ2 * ∆Ө + Ө2).        (4)     
The optimal contract (3) and (4) are very similar to the private procurement contract (PP) 
and are identical if k = 1. Its implication is that the less motivated bureaucrat, bureaucrat with 
highest value of k, equally values her two objectives (maximizing the expected values of the 
dam and the excess budget). This bureaucrat enjoys her excess budget at the cost of providing 
lower expected value of the dam relative to bureaucrat with lower k. 
On the other hand if k < 1, comparing (3) and (4) with the benchmark optimum values, we 
can conclude that the value of the dam is larger in contract offered by the bureaucrat than 
contract offered by private firms. Intuitively, with unrestricted budget and the bureaucrat is 
intrinsically motivated, she is highly devoted to her objective of maximizing the expected 
value of the dam as compared to the private manager. This finding matches with what Besley 
and Ghatak (2005) argue. Besley and Ghatak argue that “Bureaucrats are organized around a 
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mission and bureaucrats work harder when they buy into the mission of the organization.” 
Thus, for lower k (when the bureaucrat is intrinsically motivated) and operates under 
unrestricted budget, the contract offered by bureaucrat has the advantage over the contract 
offered by private manager in providing better expected value of the dam to the society.  
3.3 Budget Constrain does bind  
Now we see the case when the budget constraint is binding. The binding budget is common 
in public bureaucracy, in which the sponsor allocated a fixed budget to the bureaucrat based 
on the detail tasks reported by the bureaucrat and its previous budgeting experience. If the 
budget constraint is binding, B = t1 = Ө1q1 + ∆Өq2. In this situation, the bureaucrat offers 
either separating or pooling contract depending on the values of ϒ and k. The bureaucrat 
offers the separating contract if and only if the following condition satisfies:  
ϒ(1/λ1*Ө1 – 1/λ2*∆Ө) ≥ k*∆Ө/λ2.  
This is the condition in which the most efficient contractor constructs a higher quality dam 
than the inefficient one (q1 > q2) or in other word this is the condition when the monotonicity 
constraint should satisfy. 
 If ϒ(1/λ1*Ө1 – 1/λ2*∆Ө) ≥ k*∆Ө/λ2 doesn’t satisfy, the bureaucrat prefers to offer the 
pooling contract. In pooling contract the bureaucrat offers the same quality i.e q1 = q2 = q. 
using this quality, from the binding (IC1) we have t1 = t2 = t. which implies each type of 
contractor obtaining identical contract. The optimal level of transfer in pooling contract is the 
same as the budget level B and the optimal level of the value of the dam can easily be derived 
from the (IR2). Thus, t = B and B - Ө2q = 0, where t is the transfer in pooling contract and q is 
the quality offers in pooling contract. 
If ϒ(1/λ1*Ө1 – 1/λ2*∆Ө) ≥ k*∆Ө/λ2 satisfies, it is optimal for the bureaucrat to offer a 
separating contract with q1 > q2 and from binding (IC1) we can find  that t1 > t2. The optimal 
expected value of the dam and the optimal transfer for separating contract can be derived from 
the above first order condition by setting µ = 0 (since q1 > q2). Thus, the optimal expected 
value of the dam and the transfers are: 
V`(q1) = Ө1(k + ϒ/λ1);   
V`(q2) = ∆Ө(λ1/λ2*k + ϒ/λ2) + kӨ2;  
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t1 = Ө1q1 + ∆Өq2 and 
t2 = Ө2q2. 
 Comparing these expected optimal values with the optimal values we found in (3) and (4) 
(under the case of non binding budget constraint), bureaucrat provides lower expected optimal 
value of the dam in the case when the budget is binding. This can be shown graphically as 
follows: 
 
  
 
              V`(q1) 
    Ө1(k + ϒ/λ1)  
 
                  kӨ1  
  
                                        q12            Q                                              q1 
Fig. 1: The optimal qualities of the dam constructed by the efficient contractor. 
In the graph shown above, we were trying to compare the qualities of the dam constructed 
by the efficient contractor under the two conditions (budget constrain doesn’t bind and budget 
constrain binds). V`(q1) is the first derivative of the value function and it has a down ward 
sloping graph because its second derivative is less than 0 (concave value function).  kӨ1 is the 
cost of the efficient contractor at the expected optimal value of the dam and under the 
condition when the budget constrain doesn’t bind. Ө1(k + ϒ/λ1) is the cost of the efficient 
contractor at the expected optimal value of the dam and under the condition the budget 
constrain binds. It is obvious that kӨ1 < Ө1(k + ϒ/λ1) because Ө1ϒ/λ1 > 0.  This is shown on 
the graph by drawing Ө1(k + ϒ/λ1) above kӨ1.  
When the budget constrain doesn’t bind, the quality of the dam constructed by the efficient 
contractor is Q and when the budget constrain binds the quality of the dam constructed is q12. 
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These are the qualities of the dam constructed at the expected optimum value of the dam with 
Q > q12. Thus, we can conclude that bureaucrat offers a contract that provides a higher quality 
dam under the condition the budget constrain doesn’t bind than it binds.  
We can also draw similar graph for the inefficient contractor and compare the results under 
the two conditions (budget constrain bids and budget constrain doesn’t bind). The costs of the 
inefficient contractor at the expected optimal value of the dam under the condition budget 
constrain doesn’t bind and budget constrain binds respectively are K(λ1/λ2 * ∆Ө + Ө2) and  
∆Ө(λ1/λ2*k + ϒ/λ2) + kӨ2. Since ∆Ө(λ1/λ2*k + ϒ/λ2) + kӨ2 > K(λ1/λ2 * ∆Ө + Ө2), the graph 
of the constant cost under the case the budget constrain binds is drown above the graph of the 
constant cost under the case the budget constrain doesn’t bind. Graphically this can be shown 
as,      
 
 V`(q2) 
 
                                             
∆Ө(λ1/λ2*k + ϒ/λ2) + kӨ2 
K(λ1/ λ2 * ∆Ө + Ө2)  
    
                                                                  Q*         q*                                                    q2                                                   
 
     Fig. 2: The Optimal qualities of the dam constructed by the inefficient contractor. 
As we can see from the graph, the quality of the dam constructed is higher under the 
condition in which the budget constrain doesn’t bind than budget constrain binds (q* > Q*). 
Thus, whether the contractor is the efficient or the inefficient type, the expected value of the 
dam or the quality of the dam constructed is higher under the condition the budget constrain 
doesn’t bind. 
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We summarize the effects of budget allocation on the expected value of the dam in the 
following proposition.   
Proposition 1: If the budget constraint is not binding, the bureaucrat offers a separating 
contract. In this case it is only the motivation of the bureaucrat that matters to implement the 
second best private procurement contract and the expected value of the dam is greater for 
contract offered by bureaucrat than the contract offered by the private manager. On the other 
hand if the budget constraint is binding, the bureaucrat offers either the separating or pooling 
contract depending on the values of k and ϒ.  
4 The Politician Problem 
The objective of the politician is to maximize its payoff function, P(q) stated in section 2 
above. This is possible either by higher expected value of the dam (λ1V(q1) + λ2V(q2)) or 
lower budget, B. As we presented in proposition one the expected value of the dam, (λ1V(q1) 
+ λ2V(q2)), depends on the budget level and the motivation level of the bureaucrat. The 
motivation level of the bureaucrat is out of control of the politician. However, the politician 
can play with the budget level given the motivation level of the bureaucrat. In other word 
given the motivation level of the bureaucrat, the politician can anticipate the expected optimal 
value of the dam and so that determines the budget allocated to the bureaucrat. Thus, in this 
section we will see how the politician determines the budget allocated to the bureaucrat 
anticipating the expected optimal value of the dam from the contract offered by her. 
The politician chooses the size of budget B given the motivation level of the bureaucrat, k. 
Starting from the extreme value of k, i.e k = 1 and assuming that the budget is not binding (B 
> t1), we can see from (3) and (4) that the bureaucrat can provide the same expected value of 
the dam as the private procurement outcome and at the same time she has also a larger 
unspent budget. However, the politician doesn’t prefer this excess budget and so either it 
reduces the budget to the lowest possible level or fully control the bureaucrat by offering a 
contract directly to the contractor. If the politician would contract directly with the contractor 
it must give a fixed budget to him. Thus, the politician is not able to save money when the 
cost is high and the expected value of the dam is low.  In this case, the expected payoff the 
politician is lower as compared to its payoff from the contract offered by the bureaucrat. In 
other word, the politician’s marginal cost of the contract it offers through a fixed budget is 
larger than the bureaucrat’s marginal cost of the contract she offers through a contingent 
transfer. This implies that the bureaucrat would produce more than what the politician expect 
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if she is access to unlimited budget. Therefore, since the politician has a room to reduce the 
budget allocated to the bureaucrat without distorting the expected value of the dam as 
compared to the private procurement outcome, it wants to allocate smaller budget to the 
bureaucrat than the amount necessary to implement the private procurement outcome. 
For k < 1 and if the budget is not binding, from (3) and (4) we can observe that the 
bureaucrat would even over produce relative to the case where k = 1. In this case, bureaucrat 
has a stronger preference for the expected value of the dam.  It a gain implies that the 
politician allocates her a smaller budget so as to enjoy higher payoff. 
This is the indirect way the politician control the bureaucrat with out affecting the expected 
value of the dam relative to the outcome of the private firms. As we observe from the right 
hand side objective function of the bureaucrat and the objective function of the politician, 
reducing budget has a direct effect of decreasing the excess budget of the bureaucrat and 
increasing the payoff the politician.  
Lower k (k < 1) insures the politician that the expected value of the dam is higher than 
what it expected. Thus, in this case the best response of the politician is to lower the level of 
budget allocated to the bureaucrat. Again under the circumstance when k takes its critical 
values, k = 1 the contract offered by the bureaucrat gives a higher expected value of the dam 
relative to the contract offered by the politician. Thus, anticipating the higher value of the dam 
than what it expected, the politician best response is to reduce the budget allocated to the 
bureaucrat. 
Here, whether the bureaucrat is motivated or less motivated the budget allocated to her is 
fixed and should be low as much as possible. This implies that, the budget allocation from the 
politician is less sensitive to the motivation of the bureaucrat or the budget can be seen as 
depending very little on the bureaucrat’s actual performance.      
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Extension of the Model 
In this part of the paper I extend the politician problem to the case in which the politician 
exercises direct control on the bureaucrat by relaxing the major assumption in the above 
sections (i.e the politician doesn’t exercise direct control on the bureaucrat). Introducing 
direct control by the politician, I will show that control can reduce the excess budget and shift 
resources from the budget drift goal of the bureaucrat to a better expected value of the dam. I 
will also extend the politician problem to the case in which it cares for the pollution effects 
the construction of the dam causes on the society.  
5 Direct Controls by the Politician  
So far, we assumed that the politician has no direct control over the bureaucrat as it cannot 
observe the quality of the dam constructed or the unspent budget. Suppose now that the 
politician can control over how the budget is spent and increase its effective utilization. 
Tighter Control by the politician makes it difficult for the bureaucrat to divert funds from the 
construction of the dam which is the politician’s main mission. 
I will show that under complete information about the motivation level of the bureaucrat, 
tighter control allows the politician to increase the expected value of the dam and offer larger 
budgets to the bureaucrat. This raises the potential issue of bureaucrats claiming to be more 
motivated than they are in order to obtain larger budget, which I will analyze by modeling 
asymmetric information about the bureaucrat’s motivation, denoted by k. I will also show 
how control by the politician can use as screening device to offer different budgets and exert 
different control intensities on bureaucrats with different level of motivation. 
I model the politician’s direct control in a simple way by assuming that it reduces the 
values attached to unspent budget by the bureaucrat. As we can see from section three, 
bureaucrat provides a higher expected value of the dam than the private manager or private 
firms even under the circumstance she involves in a massive amount of excess budget. Thus, 
the politician exercises direct control on bureaucrat by assuming that control reduces the value 
of unspent budget. In simple word, the main mission of exercising direct control is to reduce 
the amount of unspent budget. 
If the politician exerts control with intensity p Є [0, 1], the bureaucrat relative value of 
excess budget is given by k(1- p). Controlling has a cost to the politician and this cost is given 
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by an increasing and convex function, m(p). Assuming that the politician can commit to the 
control intensity, the bureaucrat’s objective function is now given as: 
 U = [λ1V(q1) + λ2V(q2)] + k(1-p)(B - λ1 t1 - λ2 t2). 
 Notice that the main difference between this function and the objective function of the 
bureaucrat discussed in section 3 is that this function contains the new parameter p.  
If the politician doesn’t exert a direct control on the bureaucrat (which implies p = 0), our 
previous model of the bureaucrat discussed in section 3 applies i.e U becomes [λ1V(q1) + 
λ2V(q2)] + k(B - λ1 t1 - λ2 t2). If it could control with intensity 1, it would be impossible for the 
bureaucrat to benefit from unspent budget and U become reduces to [λ1V(q1) + λ2V(q2)] i,e 
bureaucrat involves only in maximizing the expected value of the dam. 
Given B and p, the bureaucrat solves, U = [λ1V(q1) + λ2V(q2)] + k(1-p)(B - λ1t1 - λ2t2) 
subjected to the same (ICi) and (IRi) constraints as before and determines the optimal qualities 
and transfers for the contractor, q(B, k(1-p)), t(B, k(1-p)) and her indirect utility can be 
presented as U(B, k(1-p)). 
Solving this problem and compare the result with the case when politician doesn’t control 
the bureaucrat, direct control by the politician reduces the excess budget and resulted in 
higher expected value of the dam. The problem of the bureaucrat under the case in which the 
politician directly control her can be presented as,  
max [λ1V(q1) + λ2V(q2)] + k(1-p)(B - λ1t1 - λ2t2), subjected to  (IR2), (IC1), (BG1) and (M). 
Substituting t1 and t2 using the binding (IR2) and (IC1), we can write the Lagrange as follows:  
L = λ1V(q1) + λ2V(q2) + k(1-p)(B - λ1(Ө1q1 + ∆Өq2) - λ2Ө2q2) +ϒ(B - (Ө1q1 + ∆Өq2) + µ(q1 - 
q2). Where, ϒ > 0 and µ > 0 are the Lagrange multipliers for (BG1) and (M) constraints 
respectively. The two first order conditions with respect to the qualities are: 
W.r.t q1:  λ1V`(q1) – k(1-p) λ1Ө1 - ϒӨ1 + µ = 0.      
W.r.t q2: λ2V`(q2) – k(1-p) λ1∆Ө - k λ2Ө2 - ϒ∆Ө - µ = 0. Rearranging the conditions, the 
results can be presented as, 
V`(q1) = Ө1(k(1 – p) + ϒ/ λ1) - µ/ λ1      (5) 
V`(q2) = kӨ2 + µ/λ2 + ∆Ө(λ1/λ2 * k(1- p) + ϒ/λ2)       (6) 
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The optimal expected values (1) and (5), (2) and (6) are quite similar except that the 
effective k is now k(1- p) which is obviously lower than k for p ≠ 0. Thus, the expected value 
of the dam is higher in the case when the politician exercises direct control over the 
bureaucrat than under the case it doesn’t control the bureaucrat. 
Even though the politician exercises direct control to lower the value the bureaucrat 
attaches to unspent budget, as we can see from (5) and (6), this leads to more resources being 
spent on constructing the dam given any budget. Thus, if the politician can control budget 
expenditures, it will offer the bureaucrat a larger budget and the bureaucrat will respond by 
offering a contract that provides a higher expected value of the dam. In other word, a lower k 
implies a higher budget. This is possible in the following ways. Recall that the politician 
allocates the fixed budget to maximizes its expected net benefit, λ1V(q1) + λ2V(q2) - B. The 
politician anticipates that bureaucrat that resist the politician budget offers in the name of 
offering higher incentive to the contractor have a higher k values. The politician knows that, 
the bureaucrat does so to engage in policy drift (by increasing the amount of unspent budget), 
which comes at the cost of a lower expected value of the dam. Therefore, for higher values of 
k, the politician curtails the bureaucrat’s ability to engage in policy drift by lowering the 
budget. 
The overall effects of the politician direct control as compared to the case that it doesn’t 
control the bureaucrat are presented in the following proposition.        
Proposition 2: direct control by the politician reduces the level of k, reduces the excess 
budget of the bureaucrat and so that provides higher expected value of the dam as compared 
to the case the politician doesn’t control the bureaucrat. 
The politician will exert direct control (i.e chooses p). Given p, it is easy to prove that the 
effective k, k(1-p) still increase with k. Since a higher effective k implies that the allocation of 
a lower budget to the bureaucrat, the less motivated bureaucrat, bureaucrat with higher k, will 
receive a smaller budget. This observation leads us to explore the possibility that a bureaucrat 
may have an incentive to over-state her degree of motivation in attempt to secure a larger 
budget. This is the same as to say, the bureaucrat with higher effective k tempts to act as if 
they have lower effective k.  
Taking the above stated adverse selection problem in to consideration, I explore the 
politician problem by introducing asymmetric information about k. I will show that 
 21 
 
asymmetric information about k makes budget allocation less sensitive to the bureaucrat’s 
type. 
Now let us solve the politician direct control problem by introducing asymmetric 
information about k. In contrast to the above values of k, the k I introduce in asymmetric 
information case is discrete and takes two values, {k1, k2}. The bureaucrat knows her own 
type k Є {k1, k2} with k2 > k1 > 0, while the politician just believes that the probability of ki is 
πi where i Є {1, 2}, and π1 + π2 = 1. 
If there was no scope for direct control as in section 3, the politician would have no 
screening instrument and it would have to offer the same budget to all types of bureaucrat. On 
the other hand as I explore it here, if the politician can control the bureaucrat it can allocates 
different amounts of budget with different control intensities to ensure incentive compatibility 
for each types of bureaucrat. Thus, the contract design by the politician to the bureaucrat is 
given by the menu, {Bi, pi} for i= 1, 2. 
Before solving the politician direct control problem under asymmetric information about k, 
let start to solve the control problem under complete information about k. Under complete 
information about k the politician exercises direct control on the bureaucrat so as to maximize 
the net expected value of the dam without any constraint. The reason is that, as a worker in 
the public offices, the bureaucrat is already on duty which implies the only constraint under 
complete information, the participation constraint is satisfied. 
Thus, under asymmetric information, the politician solves the following maximization 
problem:  
max λ1V(q1) - B1 – m(p1) + λ2V(q2) – B2 – m(p2).  Representing the expected value of the 
dam, λ1V(q1) by X1 and λ2V(q2)) by X2. Then, the maximization problem can be rewrite as,  
max X1 – B1 – m(p1) + X2 - B2 – m(p2). The first order conditions with respect to B1 and B2 
respectively are,  
∂X1/∂B1 = 1,  
∂X2/∂B2 = 1, 
and the first order conditions with respect to p1 and p2 respectively are, 
∂X1/∂p1 = m`(p1),  
 22 
 
∂X2/∂p2 = m`(p2).  
 Having the above results for complete information case, I am now going to solve the 
politician problem under asymmetric information about bureaucrat’s type. Since only the less 
motivated bureaucrat will have an incentive to claim to be motivated, the politician’s contract 
under asymmetric information about k should satisfy the following incentive constraint for the 
bureaucrat: k2(1 - p2)[B2 - λ2t2] ≥ k2(1 – p1)[B1 - λ1t1]. With the incentive to mimic the 
motivated bureaucrat, the less motivated bureaucrat incentive should be derived from her 
policy drift objective and should be satisfied for the screening mechanism to work. If the 
incentive constraint is binding, the politician reduces p2 and increases B2 or increases p1 and 
decreases B1 for the incentive constraint to satisfy. Then, with the participation constraint 
already satisfied, the politician solves the following maximization problem subjected to the 
incentive constraint:  
max π1(λ1V(q1)- B1-m(p1)) + π2( λ2V(q2) - B2 - m(p2)), Subjected to k2(1 - p2)[B2 - λ2t2] ≥ k2(1 
– p1)[B1 - λ1t1].  
Representing λ1V(q1) by X1 and λ2V(q2) by X2 and Setting the Lagrange for the above 
problem, 
L = π1(X1- B1 - m(p1)) + π2(X2 - B2 - m(p2)) + σ[k2(1 - p2)(B2 - λ2t2) - k2(1 – p1)(B1 - λ1t1)]. 
Where, σ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier for the incentive compatibility constraint of less 
motivated bureaucrat. The first order conditions with respect to the budgets are, 
∂L/∂B1 = π1[∂X1 / ∂B1 - 1] + σ(-k2 + k2(∂p1/∂B1 + p1) = 0. 
∂L/∂B2 = π2[∂X2/∂B2 - 1] + σ(k2 – k2(∂p2/∂B2 + p2) = 0. Rearranging the conditions we have, 
∂X1 / ∂B1 = 1 + σk2/ π1 *(1 - (∂p1/∂B1 + p1)        (7).  Where, ∂p1/∂B1 + p1 ≤ 1 
∂X2/∂B2 = 1 + σk2/ π2 *((∂p2/∂B2 + p2) - 1)         (8).   Where, ∂p2/∂B2 + p2 ≤ 1 
Comparing (7) and (8) with the results we found under complete information about k, a 
one unit increase in budget, increases the expected value of the dam by σk2/ π1 * (1 - (∂p1/∂B1 
+ p1) unit for motivated bureaucrat and decreases by σk2/π2 * ((∂p2/∂B2 + p2) - 1) unit for less 
motivated bureaucrat. As I showed in section 4, if the bureaucrat offers a contract that yields a 
higher expected value than what the politician expected, the best response by the politician is 
to reduce the budget allocated for the bureaucrat. By the same reason for a one unit increase 
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in budget, since the motivated bureaucrat’s expected value of the dam is above the expected 
value of the dam in the case of complete information, the best response by the politician is to 
reduce the budget level of the motivated bureaucrat as compared to the complete information 
case. On the other hand, since the less motivated bureaucrat’s expected value of the dam is 
lower as compared to the complete information case, the best response by the politician is to 
increase the budget level in order to increase the expected value of the dam. 
The asymmetric information consolidate with the bureaucrat type, helps the  less motivated 
bureaucrat to have excess budget which she involves in her policy drift objective. This facts 
can also state as, motivated bureaucrat uses most of her additional budget for maximizing the 
expected value of the dam while the less motivated bureaucrat use this budget for her policy 
drift objective at the cost of providing lower expected value of the dam.  If the politician can 
fully control the bureaucrats (the case where ∂p1/∂B1 + p1 = 1 and ∂p2/∂B2 + p2 = 1 in (7) and 
(8) respectively), the results we find in (7) and (8) are identical to the complete information 
case. 
The first order condition with respect to the control intensities are: 
∂L/∂p1 = π1(∂X1/∂p1 - m`(p1)) + σ(-(-k2 +∂( B1 - λ1 t1)/ ∂p1))  = 0. Where, ∂( B1 - λ1t1)/ ∂p1 ≤ 0. 
∂L/∂p2 = π2(∂X2/ ∂p2 - m`( p2)) + σ(-k2 + ∂(B2 - λ2 t2)/ ∂p2)) = 0. Where, ∂(B2 - λ2 t2)/ ∂p2 ≤ 0. 
Rearranging the results we have,  
m`(p1) = ∂X1/∂p1 + σk2/ π1 – σ/ π1 *∂( B1 - λ1 t1)/ ∂p1         (9).  
m`( p2) = ∂X2/ ∂p2 - σk2/ π2 + σ/ π2 * ∂(B2 - λ2 t2)/ ∂p2        (10).  
Comparing (9) and (10) with the complete information case, p1 increases while p2 
decreases. The reason is that, to satisfy the incentive constraint of the less motivated 
bureaucrat, the politician should increases p1 and decreases p2 relative to the complete 
information case. 
In general as compared to the complete information cases, asymmetric information about 
bureaucrat’s type forces the politician to increase the budget and decreases the control 
intensity for the less motivated bureaucrat, decreases the budget and increases the control 
intensity for the motivated bureaucrat. This can be summarized in the following propositions 
as follows.   
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Proposition 3: Asymmetric information about bureaucrat’s type has the effect of increasing 
the budget and effective k for less motivated bureaucrat while decrease them for the more 
motivated bureaucrat.  
6 Centralized Contracts as a Means to Control the Bureaucrat 
It is commonly known that the construction industries are the major source of pollution. 
The construction of the dam as elements of the construction industries has also major source 
of air, water and noise pollutions. As the agent to the society, the politician wants to attain the 
socially efficient and minimum level of pollution arises from the construction of the dam. For 
this to happen, the politician wants the dam to be constructed by the contractor with lower 
pollution cost. The contractor incurs a cost to reduce the damage the construction of the dam 
causes on the environment. I assume that the contractor takes some measures to prevent these 
pollution problems. 
The main measures taken by the contractors to reduce the pollutions are: to prevent erosion 
and run off, minimize land disturbance and leave maximum vegetation cover, control dusts 
through fine water sprays used to dampen the site, screen the whole site to stop dust spreading 
or alternatively, place fine mesh screening close to the dust source, cover piles of building 
materials like cement, sand and other powders, regularly inspects for spillages and locate 
them where they will not be washed in to water ways or drainage areas, use non-toxic paints, 
solvents and other hazardous materials wherever possible, segregate, tightly cover and 
monitor toxic substances to prevent spills and possible site contamination, cover up and 
protect all drains on site, collect any waste water generated from site activities in settlement 
tanks, screen, discharge the clean water, and dispose of remaining sludge according to 
environmental regulations, use low Sulphur diesel oil in all vehicles and equipment engines 
and incorporate the latest specifications of particulate filters and catalytic converters, no 
burning of materials on site and reduce noise pollution through carful handling of materials, 
modern, quite power tools, equipment and generators, low impact technologies, and wall 
structure as sound shields. 
The above measures taken by the contractors to reduce air, water and noise pollutions are 
assumed to be included as parts of the quality of the dam and it costs the contractor βi for i = 
1,2 per quality of the dam constructed. The constant β is private information of the contractor 
and it takes two values β1 with probability α1 and β2 with probability α2 and with ∆β = β2 - β1 
> 0 and α1 + α2 = 1. As we briefly present in section 2 and here also, β1 is the marginal cost of 
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pollution of the efficient contractor and β2 is the marginal cost of pollution of the inefficient 
contractor.  
From the measures taken by the contractor, we can understand that internalizing the 
negative externalities arise from the construction of the dam is possible when the contract 
design by the bureaucrat incorporate this cost in to the transfer made to the contractor. This 
transfer should at least exceed the sum of the private cost and pollution cost incurred by the 
contractor. However, the key problem here is that the bureaucrat doesn’t care for the pollution 
cost caused by the construction of the dam in designing her mechanism and do not want to 
include this concern in her objective function. 
The main reason for the bureaucrat not prefers to internalize this cost is that she operates 
under a fixed budget allocated from the politician. From the bureaucrats objective function 
stated in section 2, we can see that bureaucrat has an objective of maximizing excess budget 
and this is possible if the budget allocated to her exceeds the contingent transfers she pays to 
the contractor. The contingent transfers to the contractor must at least greater than or equal to 
the sum of both the private and pollution costs (the social cost) if the bureaucrat is 
environmentalist and it must be greater than or equal to the private cost if the bureaucrat is not 
environmentalist. Since the social cost exceeds the private cost, the excess budget to the 
bureaucrat under the condition the bureaucrat is environmentalist is lower than under the 
condition in which she doesn’t care for the environment. 
Due to the above reason, bureaucrat doesn’t prefer to design an incentive contract that 
enables the contractor to internalize the pollution cost. The contractor bears the pollution cost 
as far as the bureaucrat designs an incentive feasible menu of contract that considers and 
incorporated this cost. Since considering the pollution cost in designing the contract reduces 
the bureaucrat’s payoff, the bureaucrat prefers to exclude this cost in designing a contract to 
the contractor. Thus, the contract designed and offered by the bureaucrat doesn’t solve the 
pollution problem the construction of the dam imposes on the environment. Therefore, a 
conflicting of interests arises between the politician and the bureaucrat. 
The politician wants to delegate designing and offering contract to its delegate, the 
bureaucrat so as to maximize the expected value of the dam with the efficient and lowest level 
of pollution. However, the contract design by the bureaucrat doesn’t include the pollution cost 
for the reason that it decreases her payoff. Thus, the central idea of this section is to find out 
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the mechanism the politician use to control the bureaucrat and attain the socially efficient and 
minimum level of pollution arises from the construction of the dam. 
Internalizing the pollution cost and including the marginal cost of pollution to the analysis, 
now the contractor can be of four possible types (low private cost, low pollution cost), (low 
private cost, high pollution cost), (high private cost, low pollution cost) and (high private cost, 
high pollution cost). The types are private information to the contractor and assumed to be 
independent. The alternative way to represent the above stated types with their respective 
probabilities are, (Ө1, β1) type with probability (λ1, α1), (Ө1, β2) type with probability (λ1, α2), 
(Ө2, β1) type with probability (λ2, α1) and (Ө2, β2) type with probability (λ2, α2). Since we 
assume the independency of the types, we can multiply the probabilities and so that we have:  
(Ө1, β1) type with probability λ1α1, 
(Ө1, β2) type with probability λ1α2, 
(Ө2, β1) type with probability λ2 α1 and 
(Ө2, β2) type with probability λ2α2 (with, λ1α1 + λ1α2 + λ2 α1 + λ2α2 = 1). 
The politician knows that the contractor can be of the above stated possible types. 
Knowing this, the politician can design an incentive feasible menu of contract that satisfies 
the incentive and participation constraint of each type and gives it to the bureaucrat to be 
implemented. Let call this contract the centralized contract to identify it from delegation 
contract. In delegation contract, it is the bureaucrat who designs and offer contract to the 
contractor. 
The main idea of the centralized contract is that instead the politician delegates the task of 
mechanism design to the bureaucrat; it designs the contract and gives it to the bureaucrat. The 
bureaucrat is now acts as a monitor to organize the construction work of the dam. In 
centralized contract, the politician doesn’t delegate the task of mechanism design to the 
bureaucrat. This implies that no budget allocation to the bureaucrat and the task of mechanism 
design are overtaken by the politician. Assuming that a constant β represents the cost of 
pollution the construction of the dam imposes on the society; q3, q4, q5 and q6 are the qualities 
of the dam constructed by the above contractor’s type respectively and t3, t4, t5 and t6 are their 
respective contingent transfers, then the politician solves  problem; 
P1(q) =  λ1α1(V(q3) - t3) + λ1α2(V(q4)- t4) + λ2α1(V(q5) - t5) + λ2α2(V(q6) - t6) -  β.  
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Where λ1 and λ2 are the probabilities that the contractor is efficient and inefficient type 
respectively, V(q) is the values the quality of the dam gives to the politician. It is concave and 
increasing function of q; α1 and α2 are the probabilities that the contractor has low marginal 
cost of pollution and high marginal cost of pollution respectively. 
Even if “centralized contract” is totally different from the “delegation contract”, in this 
section I raise the issue of centralized contract as the means of controlling the bureaucrat. 
Assuming that the bureaucrat or the monitor in this case can (1) observe the quality of the 
dam freely (2) report it truthfully to the politician, the politician can implement the second 
best contract. In applying the centralized contract as a means to control a bureaucrat, the 
previous assumptions the politician has no time, knowledge or license to design the contract 
by it self are relaxed. In the centralized contract as a controlling instrument used by politician, 
the politician designs an incentive feasible contract (that satisfies the incentive and 
participation constraints of the contractor) and gives it to the bureaucrat or to the monitor to 
be implemented. 
Before we solve the above problem, let start to solve from the simple one by assuming that 
the politician doesn’t consider the pollution cost arises from the construction of the dam in 
setting its objectives. This is the case when β = 0 in P1(q). We use this case as the benchmark 
of the complex model stated above. Thus, the benchmark model (the case when the politician 
doesn’t consider the pollution impacts the construction of the dam imposes on the society) is 
similar to the contract offered by private firms. In this benchmark case, the objective function 
of the politician is only restricted to maximize the expected value of the dam and the cost to 
the contractor is only the private cost. This is the same as to say the politician solves P1(q) 
given that β = 0 and the contractor can be of two possible type, subjected to the same (ICi) 
and (IRi) constraints stated in section 3. In this set up, the contractor can be the efficient (Ө1) 
or the inefficient (Ө2) types. 
The main reason to set up the benchmark model in this section is to simplify the analysis of 
the centralized contract and moreover to use it for comparative measures for the results we 
will compute in centralized contract by including the pollution cost. 
If the pollution impact of the construction of the dam doesn’t internalize, then the 
contractor doesn’t incur the pollution cost and so that the types of the contractor is determined 
only by his private cost. As we stated it above, in this case the contractor is of two possible 
types: the efficient and the inefficient. The politician also knows this. Thus, for each type, the 
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politician designs incentive feasible menus of contract and gives it to the bureaucrat who is 
now monitoring the construction works of the dam. Generally, in this case the benchmark 
model is reduced to the private procurement contract type analyzed by Laffont and Martimort 
(2002). Now, both the politician and the bureaucrat solve the following maximization 
problem:  
max [λ1V(q1) + λ2V(q2)] - (λ1t1 + λ2t2), Subjected to (ICi) and (IRi). Where λ1 and λ2 are the 
probabilities that the contractor is the efficient (Ө1) and the inefficient (Ө2) types respectively, 
V(q) is the values the qualities of the dam give to the societies and it is a concave and 
increasing function of q,  t1 and t2 are the contingent transfer to the efficient and the inefficient 
contractors respectively. 
The results we can find here are the same as the second best private procurement contract 
analyzed by Laffont and Martimort (2002) and these results are presented in section 2 under 
sub section 2.4 for the private procurement contract (PP). I use these results as the benchmark 
for the centralized contract I analyze next by including the pollution cost.  
The politician employs the centralized contract to control the bureaucrat. This contract as a 
controlling instrument is used in the scenario the politician intends to internalize the 
environmental impacts the construction of the dam imposes on the societies. The politician 
uses this contract to attain the minimum and efficient level of pollution. Delegation contract 
doesn’t solve this problem for the reason stated above that the bureaucrat doesn’t want to 
include this cost in designing a contract. 
The centralized contract employed by the politician forced the bureaucrat to have the same 
objective function as the politician. From the above stated benchmark, we can see that this 
contract makes both the politician and the bureaucrat to solve the private procurement 
problem analyzed above. However, in the case of delegation and the politician is not  
environmentalist, the controlling method applied is used for the purpose of shift the budget 
from the budget drift objective of the bureaucrat to maximize the expected value of the dam. 
In other word, the bureaucrat solves U(k, B, q) and the controlling mechanism applied by the 
politician is the one mentioned in section 5.1 of this paper. 
Having the above benchmark results, now I extend the model to the more complex one by 
incorporating the pollution cost arises from the construction of the dam in to the objective 
function of the politician. 
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To see how the centralized contract can be computed and used as a means to control the 
bureaucrat, I employ the technique used in Laffont and Martimort (2002; 86). Laffont and 
Martimort design an incentive feasible contract for the case in which the agents are more than 
two types and they analyzed the case with three types of agents. In my case, as we can 
observe from the objective function of the politician and listed them above the contractor can 
be of four possible types. The first possible type is low private marginal cost (Ө1) and low 
marginal cost of pollution (β1) and we can call this contractor the most efficient contractor. 
The second possible type is low private marginal cost (Ө1) and high marginal cost of pollution 
(β2) and we call this contractor the second most efficient contractor. The third possible type is 
high private marginal cost (Ө2) and low marginal cost of pollution (β1) and this contractor is 
the third efficient contractor. The last and the fourth possible type is high private marginal 
cost (Ө2) and high marginal cost of pollution (β2) and we call this contractor the least efficient 
or inefficient contractor. 
The direct controlling technique we discussed in section 5.1 is only useful to screen out the 
motivated bureaucrat. The politician employed this controlling technique to shift unspent 
budget from budget drift objective of the bureaucrat and so that maximizes the expected value 
of the dam. However, in this section in addition to maximize the expected value of the dam, 
the politician has the objective of attain the minimum and efficient pollution level caused by 
the construction of the dam. Even if the bureaucrat is an agent to the politician, both possible 
types, motivated type and less motivated type, have no any concern for the pollution level 
targeted by the politician. Thus, the previous controlling method does not solve this social 
problem, pollution problem. Therefore, that is the main reason here to employ the centralized 
contract as a means to control the bureaucrat. 
To simplify the model I assume that, the types are independent and Ө2 - Ө1 = β2 - β1 = ∆Ө 
= ∆β. 
We denote the truthful direct revelation mechanism in these four types environment by 
{(t3, q3); (t4, q4); (t5, q5); (t6, q6)}. Using similar notation information rents for each type of 
contractors respectively are, 
U3 = t3 - Ө1q3- β1q3; 
U4 = t4 - Ө1q4 - β2q4;  
U5 = t5 - Ө2q5 - β1q5; and 
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U6 = t6 - Ө2q6 - β2q6.  
Where U3, U4, U5 and U6 are information rent for type (Ө1, β1), type (Ө1, β2), type (Ө2, β1) and 
type (Ө2, β2) contractors respectively, t3, t4, t5 and t6 are the contingent transfers to type (Ө1, 
β1), type (Ө1, β2), type (Ө2, β1) and type (Ө2, β2) contractor respectively and q3, q4, q5 and q6 
are the qualities of the dam constructed by type (Ө1, β1), type (Ө1, β2), type (Ө2, β1) and type 
(Ө2, β2) contractor respectively. 
For each of the four possible types, we now have the following incentive constraints:  
For the most efficient type, (Ө1, β1). 
t3 - Ө1 q3- β1 q3 ≥ t4 - Ө1 q4 - β1 q4 
U3 ≥ U4 + ∆βq4            (11) 
This incentive constraint binds the most efficient type not to take the contract designs for the 
second efficient type. 
The second incentive constraint of the most efficient type is, 
 t3 - Ө1q3- β1q3 ≥ t5 - Ө1q5 - β1q5, 
 U3 ≥ U5 + ∆Өq5          (12) 
This incentive constraint binds the most efficient type not to take the menu of contract design 
for the third efficient contractor. 
The last incentive constraint of the efficient contractor is, 
t3 - Ө1q3- β1q3 ≥ t6 - Ө1q6 - β1q6 
U3 ≥ U6 + ∆Өq6 + ∆β∆β       (13) 
Again this incentive constraint binds (Ө1, β1) type contractor not to take the menu of contract 
designs for type (Ө2, β2) contractor.  
For the second efficient type, (Ө1, β2), the incentive constraints are:  
t4 - Ө1q4 - β2q4 ≥ t5 - Ө1q5 - β2q5 
U4 ≥ U5 +∆Өq5 - ∆βq5          (14) 
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This incentive constraint binds the (Ө1, β2) type contractor not take the contract designs for 
the (Ө2, β1) type contractor. 
t4 - Ө1q4 - β2q4 ≥ t6 - Ө1q6 - β2q6 
U4 ≥ U6 +∆β q6 + ∆Ө q6         (15) 
This incentive constraint binds the (Ө1, β2) type contractor not to take the menu of contract 
designs for (Ө2, β2) type contractor. 
t4 - Ө1q4 - β2q4 ≥ t3 - Ө1q3 - β2q3 
U4 ≥ U3 -∆βq3         (16) 
This is the incentive constraint that binds (Ө1, β2) type contractor not to take the menu of 
contract designs for the most efficient contractor. 
For the third efficient type, (Ө2, β1) the incentive constraints are: 
 t5 - Ө2q5 - β1q5 ≥ t6 - Ө2q6 - β1q6 
U5 ≥ U6 + ∆βq6        (17) 
This is the incentive constraint that binds (Ө2, β1) type contractor not to take the menu of 
contract deign for the least efficient contractor.    
t5 - Ө2q5 - β1q5 ≥ t4 - Ө2q4 - β1q4 
U5 ≥ U4 + ∆βq4 - ∆Өq4         (18) 
This is the incentive constraint that binds the (Ө2, β1) type contractor not to take the menu of 
contract design for (Ө1, β2) type contractor. 
t5 - Ө2q5 - β1 q5 ≥ t3 - Ө2q3 - β1 q3 
U5 ≥ U3 - ∆Өq3            (19) 
This is the incentive constraint that prevent the (Ө2, β1) type contractor not to take the contract 
design for the most efficient contractor.  
For the least efficient type, (Ө2, β2) type, the incentive constraints are: 
t6 - Ө2q6 - β2q6 ≥ t5 - Ө2q5 - β1q5 
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U6 ≥ U5 - ∆βq5          (20) 
This constraint binds the least efficient contractor not to take the contract design for (Ө2, β1) 
type contractor.   
t6 - Ө2q6 - β2q6 ≥ t4 - Ө1q4 - β2q4 
U6 ≥ U4 - ∆Өq4            (21) 
This constraint prevent the least efficient contractor not to take the contract design for (Ө1, β2) 
type contractor.  
 t6 - Ө2q6 - β2q6 ≥ t3 - Ө1q3- β1q3 
 U6 ≥ U3 -∆Өq3 -∆βq3          (22) 
This constraint binds the least efficient contractor not to take the menu of contract design for 
the most efficient contractor. 
 These incentive constraints from (11) to (22) can be classified as “local and “global” 
incentive constraints. Local incentive constraints involves adjacent types such as the upward 
incentive constraints (11), (12), (17) and the downward ward incentive constraints (16), (19), 
(20) and (21). Global incentive constraints involve non adjacent types such as upward 
incentive constraint (13) or downward incentive constraint (22). 
To simplify the analysis and find the relevant binding constraints, intuition suggests that 
the more efficient type want to lie upward and claim they are less efficient. Therefore, we can 
ignore the downward incentive constraint (16), (19), (20), (21) and (22). Using monotonicity 
condition, the more efficient type construct higher quality of dam than the less efficient type 
and this is obvious from the first order condition of optimization. Thus, the following 
condition should be satisfied, 
q3 ≥ q4 ≥ q5 ≥ q6            (23) 
From this condition, (12) and (17) can imply the global incentive constraint (13). Constraints 
(11), (12), and (17) together can imply (15). The least efficient type participation constraint 
should also be satisfied. 
 U6 ≥ 0          (24) 
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 Thus, the relevant constraints are (11), (12), (17), (24) and (23). 
Now once the politician designs this mechanism, it gives these menus of contract to the 
bureaucrat who is now monitoring the construction work of the dam. The bureaucrat can not 
modify the contract designed by the politician. If she tried; the politician can easily identify 
the changes on the contract. Thus, the only option to the bureaucrat is offering the contract 
designed by the politician and so that the objective stated by the politician (maximizing the 
expected value of the dam and minimizing the pollution cost arises from the construction of 
the dam) can be fully addressed. 
As in Khalil and Kim (2011) concluded, centralization control or centralization contract 
achieves the second best optimum. My case also shows that “centralization control” achieves 
the second best optimum value of the dam. 
Now it is obvious that in centralized contract the objective function of the bureaucrat and 
that of the politician are the same and this is the objective function that maximizes the value 
of the dam and as well as the objective function that solve the pollution problem arises from 
the construction of the dam. Assuming that the cost of pollution arises from the construction 
of the dam is represented by β, both the politician and the bureaucrat solves, P1(q), Subjected 
to (11), (12), (17), (24) and (23). 
Representing the transfer paid as the information rent, both the politician and the 
bureaucrat will go to solve the following program: 
Max λ1α1(V(q3) - (Ө1 + β1)q3 - U3 ) + λ1α2(V(q4) - (Ө1 + β2 )q4 - U4) + λ2 α1(V(q5) - (Ө2 + 
β1)q5 - U5 ) + λ2α2(V(q6) - (Ө2  + β2)q6 - U6 ) - β, Subjected to,   (11), (12), (17), (24) and (23). 
It should be clear that constraints (11), (12), (17) and (24) are all binding at the optimal 
contract. This leads to the following expression of the information rent,  
U3 = ∆βq6 +∆Өq5,  
U4 = ∆β(q6 - q4) +∆Өq5,    
U5 = ∆βq6, and 
U6 = 0.  
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Substituting the rents in the objective function, the politician and the bureaucrat solve the 
following problem:             
Max λ1α1(V(q3) - (Ө1 + β1)q3 - ∆βq6 - ∆Өq5 ) + λ1α2(V(q4) - (Ө1 + β2 )q4 - ∆β (q6 - q4) -∆Өq5) 
+ λ2 α1(V(q5) - (Ө2 + β1)q5 - ∆βq6 ) + λ2α2(V(q6) – (Ө2  + β2)q6 ) - β, Subjected to (23). 
Introducing the Lagrange problem, the politician and the bureaucrat solve: 
L = Max λ1α1(V(q3) - (Ө1 + β1)q3 - ∆βq6 - ∆Өq5) + λ1α2(V(q4) - (Ө1 + β2)q4 - ∆β (q6 - q4) -
∆Өq5) + λ2 α1(V(q5) - (Ө2 + β1)q5 - ∆βq6 ) + λ2α2(V(q6) - (Ө2  + β2)q6) - β + ϒ1(q3 - q4) + ϒ2(q4 
- q5) + ϒ3(q5 - q6)   
Where, ϒ1 > 0, ϒ2 > 0 and ϒ3 > 0 are the Lagrange multipliers.  The first order condition with 
respect to q3, q4, q5, and q6 respectively are, 
W.r.t q3:  λ1α1V` (q3) - (Ө1 + β1) + ϒ1 = 0 
W.r.t q4:  λ1α2V`( q4) - (Ө1 + β2) + ∆β - ϒ1 + ϒ2 = 0 
W.r.t q5:  - ∆Ө - ∆Ө + λ2α1 V` (q5) - (Ө2 + β1) - ϒ2 + ϒ3 = 0 
W.r.t q6:  - ∆β - ∆β - ∆β + λ2α2V`(q6) - (Ө2  + β2) - ϒ3 = 0 
Re-arranging the above first order condition, 
V` (q3) = (Ө1 + β1) - ϒ1/λ1α1 
V` (q4) = (Ө1 + β2) - ∆β + ϒ1 - ϒ2/λ1α2 
V` (q5) = (Ө2 + β1) + ϒ2 - ϒ3 +2∆Ө/λ2 α1 
V` (q6) = (Ө2 + β2) + ϒ3 + 3∆β/λ2α2. 
Now, the expected value of the dam is lower as compared to the benchmark optimum level 
of the private procurement contract. This is due to the reason that the politician incorporates 
the external cost arises from the construction of the dam in to its objective function. It is 
obvious that internalize the external cost the construction of the dam imposes on the society 
reduces the pollution impacts on the societies, in fact at the expense of decreasing the 
expected value of the dam. The intuition behind this result is that the pollution cost 
internalized by the contractor increases his cost and higher cost implies lower expected value 
of the dam as compared to the benchmark case. In fact, the higher value of the dam is 
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generated in the benchmark model at the cost of polluting the environment. Thus, less 
polluted environment is possible at the cost of lower expected value of the dam constructed at 
the equilibrium. 
Proposition 4: Internalizing the external costs arises from the construction of the dam 
reduces the pollution costs on the environment at the expense of providing lower expected 
value of the dam as compared to the benchmark case.    
7 Conclusions 
In this paper I consider a dam constructed by the politician that provides a benefit to the 
society. Assuming that the politician has no time or ability to perform the detail tasks of the 
construction of the dam, it delegates these tasks to its delegate (employee), the bureaucrat. 
The bureaucrat again delegates the construction works of the dam to the contractor. In this 
relationship, the politician is the funding authority, it allocates a fixed budget to the 
bureaucrat for the construction works to be undertaken and more over it accept the dam mile 
stone and its completion. 
Given the fixed budget, the bureaucrat designs an incentive feasible menu of contract to 
the contractor so as to maximize the expected value of the dam and the level of excess budget. 
The excess budget is the difference between the fixed budget allocated from the politician and 
the expected transfers to the contractor. Bureaucrat attaches different weights to excess budget 
depending on their level of motivation. We assume that, this weight can take a value between 
0 and 1. Motivated bureaucrat attaches a lower weight to the excess budget while the less 
motivated bureaucrat attaches higher weight to the excess budget. Bureaucrat attaches higher 
weight to the excess budget construct lower quality dam relative to bureaucrat attaches lower 
weights. Thus, motivated bureaucrat provides a higher expected value of the dam than the less 
motivated one. 
The motivation of the bureaucrat helps her to design a contract that provides a higher 
expected value of the dam than the private firm’s contract. If bureaucrats are more motivated, 
the expected value of the dam for the contract designed by bureaucrat outperforms the 
contract designed by private firms. Thus, the major problem in the politician-bureaucrat 
relationship is due to the excess budget rather than the difference in the expected value of the 
dam. 
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So as to reduce the level of excess budget of the bureaucrat, the politician exercise direct 
control on the bureaucrat. Direct control by the politician reduces the level of excess budget 
and further increases the expected value of the dam relative to the case in which politician 
doesn’t control the bureaucrat. Under the circumstance when the politician has no room to 
design an incentive feasible contract to the bureaucrat; the politician can allocate the same 
fixed budget to the bureaucrat so as to maximize the net expected value of the dam. But under 
asymmetric information about the bureaucrat’s type and at the same time the politician have a 
chance to design an incentive feasible menu of contract to each type, the politician can control 
the bureaucrat by designing incentive mechanism. 
The contracting elements in designing the contract to the bureaucrat are the budget 
allocated and the intensities of control. If the politician has complete information about the 
bureaucrat’s type, it allocates a larger budget for motivated bureaucrat than less motivated 
one. Thus, this raises the potential problem that under asymmetric information about the 
bureaucrat’s type, the less motivate bureaucrat has an incentive to overstate her level of 
motivation. Therefore, the politician contract should be designed in such a way that it satisfies 
the incentive constraint of the less motivated bureaucrat. This incentive protects the less 
motivate bureaucrat not to take the contract design for the motivated one. Asymmetric 
information about the motivation level of the bureaucrat has the effect of increases budget and 
decreases control level for less motivated bureaucrat and decreases the budget and increases 
the control intensities to the motivated bureaucrat. 
In addition to maximizing the expected value of the dam, the politician has also the 
objective of minimizing the pollution impact the construction of the dam causes on the 
societies. To attain this objective, the politician reset its objective function so that it 
internalizes this cost. But the bureaucrat, whom the politician delegates the task of designing a 
contract to the contractor have no any concern for the effect on the environment caused by the 
construction of the dam. Reducing this cost is possible by designing a contract that considers 
this cost and as well as satisfies the incentive and participation constraints of the contractor. In 
this case, in addition to the private costs the contractor has also the pollution cost which incurs 
through the measures he takes to reduce the impact the construction of the dam causes on the 
environment. 
To reduce this cost and attain the objective restated by the politician, the new incentives 
and participation constraints of the contractor should include the pollution costs in addition to 
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his private cost. Since the objective function of the bureaucrat do not set in such a way that it 
includes this cost in designing the new contract for the contractor, the objective of the lowest 
and efficient level of pollution could not be attained. Therefore, the politician should control 
the bureaucrat to internalize this cost and attain the minimum and efficient pollution level 
arises from the construction of the dam. 
The politician uses the centralized contract to make the bureaucrat in line with the 
objective of attaining the minimum and efficient pollution level. The idea of centralized 
contract is that instead the politician delegate the task of contract design to the bureaucrat, the 
politician designs the contract by it self and gives it to the bureaucrat. The bureaucrat is now 
acts as a monitor, coordinating the construction works of the dam and offers the contract 
designed by the politician. In this circumstance both the politician and the bureaucrat solve 
the problem that internalized the pollution cost the construction of the dam causes on the 
environment. Thus, the objective of efficient pollution level attained.   
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